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ABSTRACT 
 
The authors are engaged in a multi-dimensional project that analyzes 
Canadian private sector experience under provincial and federal labour statutes. 
The broad objective of the research is to draw nuanced lessons from the 
Canadian experience that will inform the debate over labour law reform in the 
U.S. This commentary reflects the authors’ preliminary research results as they 
relate to the specific proposals included in the Employee Free Choice Act. 
 
 
he proposed amendments to the National Labor Relations Act 
(NLRA) contained in the Employee Free Choice Act (EFCA) have 
spawned an intense, politicized, and frequently misleading debate 
about the merits and possible consequences of these changes. The volume and 
tone of discussion generated by EFCA gives the impression that its proposals – 
and the question before Congress – are more complicated than they really are. 
Distilled to its essence, EFCA is concerned with how to establish whether 
employees want collective representation, and where employees have chosen to 
be represented, how to ensure that they have an opportunity to engage in 
collective bargaining. The fundamental question is how to construct a statutory 
scheme which allows employees a genuine opportunity to choose and exercise 
collective representation in the workplace. 
Decades of experience in the United States have given rise to volumes of 
research and evidence showing that, under the NLRA as presently constructed, 
there is widespread, serious, and effective illegal conduct by employers that 
deprives workers of their opportunity to make a free choice about workplace 
representation (Schmitt & Zipperer, 2007; Human Rights Watch, 2000; Friedman, 
T
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et al., 1994; U.S. Commission on the Future of Worker-Management Relations, 
1994). 
This article starts from the premise that the appropriate benchmark of a 
fair statutory collective bargaining system is whether it provides employees the 
opportunity to come to a free decision about whether or not to be represented by 
a union. Because legal provisions similar to key elements of EFCA have been in 
place for years in Canada, it makes sense to look to the Canadian experience in 
order to shed light on whether EFCA has the potential to meet this standard of 
free choice. This is not to say that Canadian approaches are ideal since there is 
clear evidence of inadequacies, but rather that some aspects of the Canadian 
framework do support a balanced collective bargaining system. 
In the U.S. one statute, the NLRA, governs labour relations for about 95% 
of the private sector. In Canada, by contrast, federal labour law applies to less 
than 10% of the private sector, with provincial laws covering the balance. This 
creates a rather complex system with eleven different jurisdictions each with its 
own legal framework. In spite of this complexity, the Canadian experience is 
directly relevant to the EFCA debate because of widespread reliance both on 
card check certification and on first contract arbitration, the two most 
controversial elements of the proposed amendment to the NLRA. Originally all 
Canadian jurisdictions employed card check certification. Over the past three 
decades six provinces have replaced card check with a mandatory vote system, 
but the other five jurisdictions continue to use card check. First contract 
arbitration is currently in force in six provinces (including the three most 
populous) and in the federal jurisdiction. 
Before addressing the specifics of card check and first contract arbitration, 
it is important to consider the meaning of ‘free choice’ in the context of collective 
representation by a union in the workplace.  A founding principle of collective 
bargaining legislation is that employees may freely choose whether or not to join 
a union. Labour legislation gives employees who have chosen collective 
representation the right to bargain collectively and engage in lawful union 
activities. But what is necessary for workers to exercise free choice in this 
context? For employees to have a true choice their decision must be free of 
improper influence about whether to be represented by a union. Furthermore, 
once a union has been selected, the workers must have a genuine opportunity to 
engage in collective bargaining. 
 
FREE CHOICE IN THE CERTIFICATION CONTEXT 
 
 Certification under the NLRA currently requires that a majority of 
employees in a proposed unit vote in favour of collective representation.  
Although representation elections have been the norm in the U.S. historically, the 
law also allows the relatively common practice of an employer voluntarily 
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recognizing a union as bargaining agent based on evidence of majority support 
without a formal election.  This option might be followed when a union has 
enough leverage to secure a commitment to voluntary recognition or neutrality 
from the employer in advance, and then is able to collect signatures from a 
majority of workers designating the union as their bargaining agent (Hurd, 
2008). Alternatively, employers may decide (for various reasons) that it is in their 
own business interests to voluntarily recognize the union.  EFCA proposes to 
elevate the signature process by allowing unions (with or without the company’s 
consent) to use a card check procedure for certification instead of a vote. As 
under current neutrality campaigns, this procedure would grant representation 
rights to a union if a majority of employees signed union authorization cards. 
Although the substantive change introduced by EFCA would be that card check 
certification would no longer require the employer’s consent, opposition to the 
proposal has been based on the sanctity of secret ballot elections.  
Both in the U.S. and in Canada, three arguments are commonly raised 
against card check certification and in support of mandatory representation 
votes. It is contended first that cards are an unreliable index of employee true 
wishes for union representation; second, that employers are deprived of the 
ability to mount anti-union campaigns under card check; and finally, that 
employees are denied information from employers about unionization under 
card check.  
 
CARD RELIABILITY 
 
 Opponents of EFCA contend that employees are likely to be deceived or 
pressured into signing cards, or they simply don’t understand that signing a card 
indicates support for union representation.  This criticism ignores the fact that it 
is a ULP (unfair labour practice) for a union to use fraud or to coerce a worker to 
sign a union authorization card; this type of union behavior would remain a ULP 
under EFCA.  Furthermore, it appears that coercion, pressuring or misleading of 
employees into card-signing has been exceedingly rare in card check systems in 
Canada.  Rather, what evidence does show is that employer interference is 
common under both card check and mandatory vote certification.  In Canada 
and the U.S. aggressive employer interference is widespread.  The most common 
manifestations are illegal firings (ULPs) and employer communications such as 
captive audience meetings (Bentham, 2002; Schmitt & Zipperer, 2007; Slinn, 
2008).  Evidence from British Columbia shows that between 1990 and mid-2007, 
covering both card check and mandatory vote certification, the overwhelming 
majority of ULP complaints and violations during certification campaigns were 
filed against employers (78% of all complaints and 88% of all violations) not 
unions (21% of all complaints 11% of all violations) (Slinn, 2008).  
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Although there is the possibility of union or employee interference in 
employee card-signing, there is little evidence from Canadian jurisdictions using 
this procedure that it is a significant or widespread problem. Indeed, cards are 
likely a reasonable indicator of whether an employee wants union representation 
and, given the frequent employer interference under the mandatory vote system, 
cards are likely at least as reliable as votes at indicating employee wishes about 
union representation. Concerns about card validity could be eased with 
additional safeguards, as has been done in some Canadian jurisdictions, such as 
providing a process for employees to revoke signed cards, performing frequent 
random audits of cards, or revoking any certification obtained through 
misconduct or fraud. 
 
INFORMED EMPLOYEES & EMPLOYER CAMPAIGNS 
 
The other two objections to card check are interrelated. Perhaps the most 
common and compelling argument against card check, and in favour of elections 
and employer campaigns, is based on a political election analogy. Essentially the 
union representation question is likened to the question of citizens’ political 
representation. In this context the secret ballot election becomes a powerful 
image, appealing to notions of free speech, informed choice and workplace 
democracy. This image is being embraced by opponents of EFCA, much as it has 
been used over the past quarter of a century in Canada when provincial 
parliaments have debated whether to replace card check with a mandatory vote. 
Because certification can occur quickly under the card check system – possibly 
even before the employer has a chance to mount a substantial response – some 
argue that employers are improperly denied a full opportunity to campaign 
against the union and, as a result, employees are deprived of full information 
about the potential effects of union representation. This raises the difficult 
question of the appropriate role of the employer – if any – in the certification 
process. 
However, the political election analogy is seriously flawed. It ignores 
fundamental differences between political representation and union 
representation. First, results of a political election determine who will govern. 
With a political election citizens are voting between two or more possible 
representatives, and do not have the option of being unrepresented. Indeed, the 
unsuccessful party in the election generally continues to have a role in the 
government as a minority voice. By contrast, a union representation election only 
determines whether workers will have a collective voice to influence terms and 
conditions of employment. Even a win by the applicant union does not transform 
the basic employment relationship; employers continue to exercise authority 
over the workplace (Becker, 1993; Weiler, 1983). 
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The contention that mandatory elections better allow for informed 
employee decision making may appear to be the most convincing facet of the 
political election analogy and argument for mandatory votes in certification 
elections. However, this argument is based on a faulty presumption: that the 
employer can and does defend the rights and interests of employees (Weiler, 
1983). Employers and employees have an inherent conflict of interest when it 
comes to the question of collective representation. Employers’ interests are 
primarily those of the owners, and in the case of corporations, the directors and 
officers have a legal duty to act in the best interests of the company’s 
shareholders. Frequently, the best interests of shareholders and employer differ 
from those of the employees. This brings into question the validity of not only 
employers’ claim to a rightful place in the election, but also employers’ 
arguments that employees benefit from an employer campaign in order to make 
an informed choice (Weiler, 1983).  
Perhaps tellingly, one reason that the members of an expert, tripartite 
labour law review committee in British Columbia chose not to recommend 
adoption of mandatory vote certification in 1998 was that they found that it was 
employers not employees who favoured replacing the card check system then in 
place with a mandatory vote (Ministry of Labour, 1998). 
 
FLAWS IN THE REPRESENTATION VOTE SYSTEM 
 
There are serious weaknesses in the representation vote system allowing, 
and perhaps even encouraging, improper employer influence over employee 
voting which bring the accuracy of such elections into question. One of the 
strongest arguments that the elections are more accurate is based on the secrecy 
of the voting procedure, itself. It is argued that because representation elections 
employ a ‘secret ballot’ procedure, employees are able to cast their vote free from 
concern that any party or fellow employee will know how that employee voted, 
and therefore workers will vote according to their true wishes. However, votes 
are not cast in truly neutral, laboratory conditions, where employees are free 
from the scrutiny of their employer, their fellow employees, or the union. Both 
unions and employers go to great lengths during the campaign to determine the 
voting intentions of individual workers. Furthermore, both union and employer 
representatives are present during balloting. Once the outcome of the vote is 
known, the employer, union and other employees often can accurately determine 
how particular employees voted. Therefore, the secrecy of the election is a factor 
which should not be given too great a weight when assessing the true objectivity 
of representation votes. 
The greatest weakness of representation elections is found during the 
period between when the employer is made aware of the unionizing effort and 
the election. Under the NLRA this period now averages about two months. There 
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is ample evidence that delay significantly reduces the likelihood of certification 
(Campolieti et al., 2007). This is not surprising, given the distinct advantages the 
employer enjoys over the union in campaigning: the employer has daily contact 
with employees while the union lacks access to the workplace; employees see 
little or no real benefits from unionization until after an agreement is negotiated; 
and, the employer retains the power to unilaterally choose new employees 
(Weiler, 1980). 
In recognition of this imbalance, all but one of the Canadian provinces 
that have replaced card check certification with mandatory vote systems have 
adopted provisions designed to minimize delays. This process has come to be 
known as quick vote certification; in four of the six provinces with mandatory 
votes there is a statutory or administrative deadline for holding the election, 
either within five working days of the union application (Ontario, Nova Scotia, 
Newfoundland), or ten calendar days (British Columbia).1 The idea is that the 
quick vote prevents employers from being able to engage in an offensive 
campaign including intimidation, discrimination and illegal tactics. However 
even in jurisdictions with explicit deadlines, it is not uncommon that elections 
are held outside the established time limit and this delay is associated with a 
significant reduction in union certification success (Campolieti, et. al, 2007). It 
appears that these delays often arise from ULP applications and hearings related 
to employer conduct during organizing. Moreover, there is evidence that 
employer ULPs are substantially more effective at defeating unionization under 
mandatory elections than under card check certification (Riddell, 2001). 
 
RESEARCH NOTE: EFCA AND U.S. UNION DENSITY 
 
In addition to the misleading furor about secret ballot elections that has 
obfuscated the true underlying issue of free choice, another contentious topic in 
the public debate over EFCA relates to the potential impact of card check 
certification. U.S. union leaders have described pent up demand for union 
representation and have forecast a flood of new members if the legislation 
passes. Opponents of EFCA have seized on these predictions and issued 
warnings about dire consequences including reduced profits, increased 
unemployment and impeded economic growth. 
Of most direct relevance here is the Layne-Farrar study (2009) which 
presents an empirical case against EFCA based on Canada’s economic 
performance and relatively high union density. Others have questioned the 
economic analysis presented in the research, but we would like to limit our 
remarks to the basic union density assumptions. At the foundation of the study’s 
catastrophic predictions is its uncritical acceptance of the most optimistic 
expectations voiced by U.S. union officials. Layne-Farrar assumes an immediate 
increase in U.S. union density of from 5 to 10 percentage points, or from the 2007 
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level of 12.1% to between 17.1% and 22.1%. Since EFCA does not apply to the 
public sector, this translates into a union density increase in the private sector 
from the 2007 level of 7.5% to between 13.5% and 19.4%. 
The optimism of U.S. union officials notwithstanding, based on the 
Canadian experience it is virtually impossible that a density increase of this 
magnitude would result from EFCA. Because in recent years several Canadian 
provinces have moved from card check to mandatory vote, or from mandatory 
vote to card check, there is direct evidence available concerning the influence of 
card check on union organizing success (and implicitly on union density). 
Several research studies have measured this impact, and they concur that a 
relative increase of 10% to 20% in organizing success can be attributed to card 
check in comparison to mandatory vote (see Slinn, 2005 for a review of the 
research). 
Princeton University scholars Farber and Western (2001) have developed 
a framework that measures the relationship between union organizing activity 
and private sector union density. Using their methodology we have been able to 
estimate the actual current level of organizing in the U.S. (representation 
elections plus card check under neutrality agreements). If we assume a 20% 
increase in organizing, the high end of the Canadian experience, the model 
forecasts only modest growth in private sector union density to approximately 
8%. 
There is, however, reason to believe that this estimate may be low. The 
Canadian research looks at card check in the context of existing Canadian labour 
law, which includes a number of other provisions that likely enhance union 
organizing and stability even under mandatory vote regimes: first contract 
arbitration, prohibitions on hiring replacement workers during strikes, absence 
of any right to work laws, and multiple other more subtle details that vary across 
the eleven jurisdictions. In the much less accommodating legal environment of 
U.S. labour law, EFCA’s simultaneous introduction of card check and first 
contract arbitration could be expected to stimulate more union growth than 
would a simple shift from mandatory vote to card check in a Canadian province. 
If instead of a 20% increase in organizing success we make what we 
believe to be an unrealistically optimistic assumption of a 100% increase, over a 
ten year period in the private sector we project that union density would grow to 
9.5%. This would indeed represent a substantial expansion in union membership, 
but only one-third of that assumed in the lower bound of the Layne-Farrar 
analysis. Alternatively, we might apply the research of Canadian scholar Susan 
Johnson (2004). She estimates that perhaps as much as one-quarter of the 
difference in union density between the two countries can be attributed to labour 
law. With 2007 private sector density of 7.5% in the U.S. and 18% in Canada, 
even if EFCA could erase the entire difference Johnson attributes to the legal 
framework, U.S. private sector union density would rise only to 10%. 
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The point of this research note on density is that the opponents of EFCA 
have used grossly distorted forecasts of the potential impact of the legislation as 
a basis for dire warnings. Practically speaking, we know from Canadian 
experience that employers vigorously and effectively oppose unionization under 
both mandatory vote and card check regimes. Yes, union representation is more 
widespread in Canada than in the U.S., but private sector density has been 
declining steadily even in card check jurisdictions. 
Yes, EFCA would make it easier for workers to form unions, and yes, 
collective representation would expand its reach. But based on the Canadian 
experience we believe that the growth in unionization would be relatively 
modest. And as argued above, we are convinced that card check certification is 
fully justifiable based on the premise that free democratic choice should be 
protected when workers consider whether to pursue collective representation. 
 
FREE CHOICE IN THE BARGAINING CONTEXT 
 
Unions and employers in both Canada and the U.S. historically have had 
great difficulty achieving first collective agreements. Among the difficulties are: 
the sheer magnitude of the task of codifying all the terms and conditions of 
employment; the bargaining relationship between the parties is immature; unit 
members may have unrealistic expectations concerning what the union will be 
able to achieve; and finally, some employers are determined to resist the union 
and this continues at the bargaining table (Johnson 2008: 1). 
Certification alone has limited significance given the substantial hurdle of 
negotiating an initial contract. To return to our fundamental question: what 
legislative structure provides employees with free choice about whether to have 
collective representation and with a fair opportunity to exercise this choice 
through collective bargaining? Simply protecting employees’ right to certify 
clearly does not accomplish this. Although collective bargaining legislation 
imposes a duty on both parties to negotiate in good faith and, in most Canadian 
jurisdictions, to make reasonable efforts to reach agreement, it is notoriously 
difficult to enforce this requirement. It was long ago recognized in Canada that 
the first set of negotiations is particularly fraught and fragile, and especially 
susceptible to being derailed by resistant employers or, perhaps, employers who 
are inexperienced at negotiations. Beginning in 1973 in British Columbia, and 
later appearing in a half-dozen other jurisdictions, various approaches to 
supporting first collective agreement negotiation have been emerged in Canada, 
most of them including the option of first contract arbitration (FCA). 
FCA procedures were introduced into Canadian law because of the 
ineffectiveness of existing approaches and remedies for dealing with bad faith 
bargaining and employer resistance. In this context employer misconduct is 
difficult for labour boards to detect as it easily can be disguised as simply hard 
   Slinn & Hurd   112 
 
bargaining. While the employer is not obligated to prove good faith, the union 
and labour board effectively bear the burden of establishing that the underlying 
intention of the employer is tainted by bad faith. Moreover, remedies for bad 
faith bargaining are often ineffective. The overarching objective of FCA 
provisions is to ensure that fair and reasonable agreements are concluded with a 
minimum of conflict, and that in the process the foundation will be laid for more 
enduring relationships (McCormack, 1991; Backhouse 1980).  
A variety of approaches to FCA have emerged in Canada. Some require 
that the applicant for arbitration demonstrate that negotiations have broken 
down due to the other party’s misconduct. Others simply require evidence of 
bargaining breakdown before the arbitration process is set into motion. One 
province provides virtually automatic access to first contract arbitration upon 
application by either side. Another jurisdiction requires participation in a 
mediation process before determining eligibility for FCA. These first contract 
models have several elements in common with provisions included in EFCA.  
Many objections are made to the EFCA first contract proposal: it involves 
a third party imposing terms on the parties; interest arbitration is costly and 
time-consuming: employers are burdened with maintaining the status quo during 
arbitration; and, it removes free choice from employers and employees. 
However, first contract provisions look much less objectionable when it is 
recognized that parties are not precluded from resuming negotiations even after 
an application for or direction to first contract arbitration has been made. A 
review of first contract cases in Ontario from 1996 to present suggest that even 
where an application for arbitration has been filed, it is common for the parties to 
settle the contract on their own before arbitration concludes, and sometimes even 
before it commences. Therefore, it ultimately remains within the parties’ control 
whether arbitration occurs or not. If parties are able to settle even some of the 
terms on their own or, as happens in some Canadian jurisdictions, submit a 
reasonable proposed collective agreement to the arbitrator, this can substantially 
reduce the time and cost of arbitration. 
Regarding the status quo requirement, the Canadian approach has been to 
impose a “freeze” on terms and conditions of work during bargaining. This is not 
a “deep freeze”: employers are able to make unilateral changes in some 
circumstances. Therefore, this requirement may not be as onerous or inflexible as 
it first appears. 
Finally, the purpose of first contract provisions is to preserve employee 
free choice by protecting the opportunity to engage in bargaining in the first 
collective agreement context. To allow one party to deprive the other of the 
opportunity to engage in real negotiations would be to truly deprive a party of 
free choice. Concerns about whether an arbitrated agreement has been ratified by 
employees or the employer is addressed in most Canadian jurisdictions by 
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setting a maximum life of one or two years on such arbitrated contracts, and by 
expressly permitting the parties to agree to modify the contract. 
Another concern raised by opponents to the EFCA first contract provision 
is that it may lead to outcomes that the employer cannot afford. This concern 
likely arises from renewal awards that have occasionally arisen in the U.S. public 
sector where the employer argues that the outcome is beyond its ability to pay. In 
reality, pattern-breaking arbitration awards deviating from established labor 
market standards are rare in the U.S. public sector and even less likely in the 
Canadian private sector. Canadian labour boards and arbitrators have 
consciously taken a very conservative approach to first contract awards, limiting 
those awards based on the employer’s financial capacity, and recognizing that 
arbitrated first agreements should not contain breakthrough or novel provisions. 
Overall, the Canadian experience has been that FCA applications are 
seldom filed and infrequently granted; even when the process is set in motion, 
parties can and do reach agreements on their own (Johnson, 2008). It is especially 
important to note that although first contract provisions were initially highly 
controversial and opposed by both labour and management, FCA is now largely 
a non-issue, and simply one more feature of the labour relations landscape. 
 
FREE CHOICE, EFCA AND THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT 
 
As EFCA continues to be debated, American workers, voters, employers, 
and politicians may do well to recall the purpose of the NLRA set out in the first, 
‘Findings and Policies’, section of the Act. The concluding words of the drafters 
may provide some guidance today as the labour relations policy is being 
revisited in difficult economic times: 
 
It is declared to be the policy of the United States to eliminate the causes of 
certain substantial obstructions to the free flow of commerce and to mitigate and 
eliminate these obstructions when they have occurred by encouraging the 
practice and procedure of collective bargaining and by protecting the exercise by 
workers of full freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of 
representatives of their own choosing, for the purpose of negotiating the terms 
and conditions of their employment or other mutual aid or protection. 
 
We would like to reiterate our initial proposition: true freedom of 
association - the right to free choice about workplace representation – is of 
fundamental importance. Based on our review of the EFCA proposal and 
relevant Canadian experience, we are convinced that the proposed amendments 
to the NLRA would indeed serve the initial purpose of the Act and reinforce 
employee rights to free choice. 
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NOTES 
                                                           
1. Saskatchewan is the exception, with no statutory or administrative time limit for holding the 
mandatory representation vote. The Alberta legislation does not specify a time limit for elections but 
does direct that elections occur “as soon as possible.” 
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